



ANNUAL REPORT  
2000-2001

1.1 In the emerging global environment, India has adopted a more comprehensive approach to security encompassing economic strength, internal cohesion and technological progress. However, given the security challenges confronting the country, India will need to maintain a desired level of military strength and preparedness to deter any aggression and to enable India to contribute positively to the promotion of peace and stability in the region.

### NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVE

1.2 India's national security objectives are served by:

- defending the country's borders as defined by law and enshrined in the Constitution; and protecting the lives and property of its citizens against terrorism and insurgencies.
- Maintaining a credible minimum deterrent against the use or the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction against India. The determination of the profile of this deterrent, including accurate and refined delivery systems, is a sovereign responsibility.
- Securing the country against restrictions on the transfer of material, equipment and technologies that have a bearing on India's security, particularly its defence preparedness. This involves a greater emphasis on indigenous research, development and production to meet the nation's requirements.

- Promoting further co-operation and understanding with neighbouring countries and implementing mutually agreed confidence-building measures.
- Working with countries of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) to address key challenges before the international community and engaging in co-operative security initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
- Pursuing security and strategic dialogue with major powers and key partners; and
- Following a consistent and principled policy on disarmament and international security issues based on the principles of supreme national interest, universality, non-discrimination and equal security for all.

### SALIENT FEATURES OF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

- 1.3 India's parameters of security clearly extend well beyond the confines of its conventional geographical land borders. Given its size, location, trade links and extensive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), India's security environment extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to across the Straits of Malacca in the east, and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to the equator in the south. Our links with most nations in this region are traditional and civilisational, supported by centuries of maritime trade and migration of people.
- 1.4 Our land frontiers exceed 15000 kms. India shares land borders with seven countries.



*"TALLY HO" - Tank following the Infantry during an exercise.*

India's peninsular shape provides her a vast coastline of 7600 km. It has a large number of far flung island territories, and an Exclusive Economic Zone of over two million square kilometers. The island territories in the East are 1300 km away from our mainland, and are virtually adjacent to our South East Asian neighbours. We share our maritime boundary with five neighbours. The seas surrounding India are likely to see the presence of extra-regional forces, at least until the oil lasts.

- 1.5 This region has strategic and tactical missiles and a sophisticated nuclear dimension. It is witnessing, an unprecedented proliferation of small arms and narcotics trafficking, which in turn, threatens the stability of states and societies.

### OUR NEIGHBOURS

- 1.6 Within the sub-continent, India's national security interests are closely linked to her immediate neighbours namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Her relations with

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Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives are stable and based upon friendship and understanding.

1.7 Regular interactions and exchanges at different levels with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal and Myanmar have succeeded in extending and deepening the broad-based relationships that exist in diverse areas. Government's focus has been on enhancing mutually beneficial linkages in the economic and infrastructural fields, promoting mutual trust and cooperation in key areas such as security, including the growing threat of terrorism and religious extremism in the region and border management; and facilitating people-to-people contact through programmes for human resource development, cultural exchanges and travel.

1.8 The ISI has been trying to exploit some areas of Nepal and Bangladesh for launching subversive activities in different parts of India, particularly in the North East and J&K. This is a cause of serious concern.

#### **BANGLADESH**

1.9 There was high-level interaction in areas including water resources, trade and defence. International dialogue on key issues relating to border management and security-related matters included Home Secretary-level talks in April 2000, Director General-level meetings between the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) in April 2000 and March-April 2001 (in New Delhi) and October 2000 (in Dhaka) and the meeting of the Joint Working Group from respective Home Ministries in New Delhi from February 15-17, 2001.

1.10 As part of the regular interaction between the Armed Forces of India and Bangladesh, the Chief of Army Staff, Gen VP Malik paid an official visit to Bangladesh in May 2000. The first India-Bangladesh Army Joint River Rafting Expedition was held in April 2000 on the Teesta and Brahmaputra (Jamuna in Bangladesh).

#### **CHINA**

1.11 Our largest neighbour China is working towards the goal of achieving super power status in the new millennium. Today China occupies approximately 38,000 sq kms of Indian Territory. In addition, under the so called Sino-Pak boundary agreement Pakistan has illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of our territory to China in POK. China also claims approximately 90,000 sq kms in Arunachal Pradesh. It is rapidly modernising its Armed Forces and is building political and military bridges with a large number of countries in our neighbourhood. Every major Indian city is within reach of Chinese missiles and it is reported that this capability is being further augmented to include Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). The asymmetry in terms of nuclear forces is strongly in favour of China which additionally has helped Pakistan to build missile and nuclear capability.

1.12 China is currently preoccupied with domestic development, and developments relating to Taiwan and the South China seas. As these problems are unlikely to be settled in the next few years, China's priority vis-à-vis India will be not necessarily to resolve, but keep differences within manageable limits. Both coun-

tries are presently actively engaged in pursuing economic liberalisation. A number of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) have been initiated and these are bearing fruit incrementally. A number of high level visits have been exchanged. The Indian President visited China in May-June 2000 and this was followed by the visit of Mr. Li Peng in January 2001. These have improved bilateral relations and enhanced mutual understanding. However, Mr Li Peng has himself admitted that there is not sufficient mutual trust and understanding between India and China.

1.13 China is a declared nuclear power with a wide range of military capabilities. India and China have an unresolved boundary. Although the border areas have remained largely peaceful, from time to time, on account of differences of perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), situations have arisen on the ground that could have been avoided had the LAC clarification been completed. The two sides have reiterated their commitment to adhere to the provisions of the 1993 and 1996 Agreements. Both sides have agreed to seek a reasonable and mutually acceptable solution of the boundary question through peaceful dialogue and through established mechanisms like the Joint Working Group and the Expert Group. In the eighth meeting of the Expert Group, both sides exchanged maps of the LAC, as perceived by them respectively, in the Middle Sector of the India-China boundary.

#### **PAKISTAN**

1.14 Pakistan continued with its hostile ap-

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proaches and policies towards India. The most obvious manifestation of this is the step-up in its sponsorship of cross-border terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of India. Simultaneously, Pakistan also continued with its shrill campaign of anti-India propaganda.

1.15 The escalation in levels of Pakistan's sponsorship of cross border terrorism was clearly indicated by the qualitative improvements in weapons, communication equipment and training that was made available to all the major Pakistan based terrorist groups such as the Jaish-e-Muhammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Harkat ul Mujahideen. The objective has been to enhance the capabilities of these groups to directly confront Indian security forces and well-protected targets. Pakistan army troops stationed on the Indo-Pakistan border also continued to provide logistic support to these groups for infiltration into India.

1.16 Efforts to sabotage peace and normalcy in Jammu & Kashmir also continued unabated. In July 2000, a unilateral cease-fire offer by the leadership of the Hizbul Mujahideen was sabotaged by stepping up the levels of violence in Jammu & Kashmir, which included the massacre of civilians on 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2000, and through intense political pressure on the group's Pakistan-based leadership. There are clear indications that Pakistan is once again seeking to sabotage the unilateral peace initiative announced by the Prime Minister on 19<sup>th</sup> November 2000 under which security forces have been instructed not to initiate combat operations against militants in Jammu & Kashmir. The

Prime Minister's unilateral peace initiative, and its subsequent three extension on 20<sup>th</sup> December 2000, 23<sup>rd</sup> January and 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2001, was widely welcomed by the people. Terrorist groups, known to have close links with Pakistan's intelligence agencies, have however, escalated the violence through attacks that included the massacre of Sikh Minorities in Jammu & Kashmir, an aborted assassination attempt against the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and threats against the office of the Prime Minister of India.

1.17 In December 2000, Pakistan announced a policy of "maximum restraint" among the Line of Control (LoC) and as part of this also announced the withdrawal of some of its troops stationed along the LoC. Following these announcements firing along the India Pakistan border has come down substantially. However, these measures are clearly self-serving in nature and do not address India's concerns related to Pakistan's continued sponsorship of cross border terrorism.

#### INDIA PAKISTAN RELATIONS

1.18 As the initiator of dialogue, India consistently reiterated its commitment to resume the Composite Dialogue which seeks to build trust and confidence, establish a stable structure of cooperation and address all outstanding issues with Pakistan. A conducive environment is an obvious requirement for a meaningful dialogue. However, as Pakistan stepped up both its sponsorship of cross border terrorism and hostile propaganda against India, it was clear that it was not interested in fostering such an environment.

1.19 Nonetheless, functional level contacts between the Governments of India and Pakistan, as well as people to people contacts between the two countries have continued. Diplomatic missions of both India and Pakistan continue to function. Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of both armies maintain weekly telephonic contacts. Officials from the BSF and Pak Rangers meet regularly for border management. Train and bus services continue as scheduled, and fishermen who inadvertently stray into each other's territorial waters are released from time to time. On the people to people front, exchanges between academics, journalists and other opinion makers, as well as visits by religious pilgrims continue to take place.

#### NEPAL

1.20 India has historically enjoyed close ties of friendship and cooperation with Nepal. These bonds are manifest in the free movement of people and goods across the open border, extensive people to people contacts and mutually beneficial cooperation in diverse fields.

1.21 Frequent high-level interactions have provided both direction and momentum to our friendship with Nepal. The visit of Hon'ble G.P. Koirala, Prime Minister of Nepal to India in July-August, 2000, was an important landmark in our bilateral relations. Both countries are committed to accelerate economic cooperation for the improvement in the quality of life of their people.

1.22 A recent development of concern is the in-

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creasing intensity and spread of Maoist violence within Nepal. The use of Nepalese territory by external vested interests inimical to the friendly relations between India and Nepal has also engaged the attention of the two Governments. The two countries have reiterated their determination to work closely to fight the scourge of terrorism and renewed their commitment not to allow their respective territories to be used for activities directed against or prejudicial to the security of the other.

#### MALDIVES

- 1.23 India-Maldives relations continue to be close and problem-free. Exchange of high level visits during 2000-2001 added further impetus to development of relations. The State visit of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of Maldives in August 2000 contributed to strengthening the existing ties between the two countries. Raksha Mantri visited Maldives from January 9-12, 2001. He held discussions with the Maldives MOS of Defence and National Security, Major General Abdul Sattar Anbaree. He also called on President Gayoom, Foreign Minister Fathulla Jameel and visited several defence establishments. Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar visited Maldives in March, 2000. The Maldivian MOS for Defence and National Security visited India from November 19-23, 2000. These visits reinforced the existing cooperation in defence related areas including Indian assistance for training and human resource development.
- 1.24 The 5<sup>th</sup> India-Maldives Joint Coast Exercise-

Dosti series – were conducted in the Maldives from October 8-12, 2000. These exercises were found to be professionally useful and were deeply appreciated by both sides.

#### BHUTAN

- 1.25 Bilateral relations between India and Bhutan are characterized by mutual trust, understanding respect and close friendship. The mutually beneficial economic cooperation between the two countries has been steadily growing and provides a firm foundation to the expanding bilateral relationship.
- 1.26 The visit of the Foreign Minister of Bhutan to India from April 17-26, 2000, the subsequent visits of Shri Lalit Mansingh, Foreign Secretary of India to Bhutan from March 7-9, 2000, and again from October 19-21, 2000 and the visit of Chief of the Army Staff, General V.P.Malik from April 27-29 2000 have further strengthened the close ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.
- 1.27 There are continuing consultations between the two Governments at various levels to address the problems on account of the presence of ULFA/BODO militants in Southern Bhutan. The Bhutanese Government continues to show concern for this problem and the 78<sup>th</sup> session of the National Assembly of Bhutan in July 2000 reiterated the decisions taken in 77<sup>th</sup> session and passed a resolution authorizing the Royal Government to launch military operations against ULFA/BODO militants, in case ongoing peaceful dialogue with them failed to achieve the objectives.

#### MYANMAR

- 1.28 India's policy of constructive engagement with Myanmar is focused on broad-basing the areas of cooperation and restoring the tradition of high-level bilateral exchanges between the two countries. Interaction at the technical and official levels continued.
- 1.29 At the invitation of the Vice President, Gen. Maung Aye, Vice Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council led a high-level delegation consisting of the Deputy Prime Minister and seven Ministers to India for a seven-day visit from November 14-21, 2000. Gen. Maung Aye called on the President and had discussions with the Vice President, Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, Home Minister, MOS for Commerce and Industry and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. The discussions were wide-ranging and covered economic cooperation, trade, cross-border projects and activities, international terrorism, drug trafficking, cooperation in the field of culture, human resource development, science and technology and regional cooperation within the framework of BIMST-EC (of which both countries are members) and the India-ASEAN Dialogue partnership. The two sides agreed to take steps to ensure peace and tranquility along the India-Myanmar border.
- 1.30 Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs visited Myanmar from February 13-15, 2001. The visit continued the tradition of personal contacts between the leaders of two friendly neighbours. The highlight of the visit

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was the inauguration of the Tamu-Kalemyo-Kalewa highway starting from the India-Myanmar border in Manipur. The road provides a cross-border link between the two countries and is expected to promote economic development, cross-border trade and tourism in the region.

- 1.31 The Chief of Army Staff, Gen. V.P. Malik paid a visit to Myanmar from July 3-6, 2000, at the invitation of Gen. Maung Aye, Vice Chairman, State Peace and Development Council and C-in-C of the Myanmar Army. The Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar visited Myanmar from January 16-19, 2001.
- 1.32 The Myanmar Home Minister, U Tin Hlaing visited India from November 2-8, 2000. He held discussions with the Union Home Minister, EAM and Raksha Mantri on a range of bilateral issues including cooperation in the areas of border management.
- 1.33 Regular institutional dialogue on border management-related matters was maintained. The 7<sup>th</sup> National Level Meeting was held in Myanmar from August 28-30, 2000; the Indian delegation for the meeting was led by the Home Secretary. Other meetings were also held as part of the institutional dialogue between the drug control authorities and local military co

#### **SRI LANKA**

- 1.34 India's multi-faceted relations with Sri Lanka saw particularly intense engagement in the political, economic and cultural fields. India consistently reiterated its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial in-

tegrity of Sri Lanka; to the restoration of lasting peace in Sri Lanka and to a peaceful, political process being the only means of achieving a lasting peace, through a negotiated settlement, which would meet the aspirations of all elements of Sri Lankan society.

- 1.35 Continuing the practice of maintaining high level contact between the two Governments, the President of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga visited India from February 22-25, 2001. Her talks with the President, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs covered bilateral, regional and international issues and were reflective of the high priority attached by both countries to the maintenance of close and friendly relations based on mutual trust and understanding. The Sri Lanka President apprised the Indian leadership of recent developments in the attempt to establish peace in Sri Lanka.
- 1.36 On June 11-12, 2000, Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs had visited Sri Lanka for an exchange of views with the Sri Lankan President and the Foreign Minister on the evolving situation in Sri Lanka, regarding which Government had expressed concern in identical statements made in both Houses on May 4, 2000.
- 1.37 Vice Admiral HCAC Tissera, Command of the Sri Lankan Navy visited India from November 2-9, 2000 and Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis paid a goodwill visit to Sri Lanka from May 11-14, 2000.

#### **AFGHANISTAN**

- 1.38 India has fundamental geo-political stakes in

the unfolding events in Afghanistan, which are detrimental to its long-term security interests in the region. Any fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan such as the Taliban, could be an insidious threat to our secularism, as well as a potentially destabilising factor in Kashmir.

- 1.39 The continuing conflict in Afghanistan and its consequences continued to affect peace and stability in our region. The Taliban and Pakistan remain committed to have a military solution to the Afghan conflict. An important aspect of military operations in Afghanistan last year was the qualitative and quantitative increase in Pakistani military assistance to the Taliban.
- 1.40 The adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1333 in December 2000 clearly reflected that the international community recognises the seriousness of the threat posed by the Taliban to regional peace and stability. The efforts to restore peace and normalcy in Afghanistan, both by the UN and through other initiatives were sabotaged by Taliban's obstinate commitment to a military solution of the Afghan conflict.

#### **MARITIME DIMENSIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN**

- 1.41 A review of global and regional trends is indicative of the fact that maritime matters are slated to play an increasingly important and critical role in India's future. Nations with a vision have already diverted substantial energies and resources towards building up of their assets in the form of coastal facilities,

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the merchant marine, ports, harbours, and mining infrastructure. Indeed, India is also moving in this direction.

- 1.42 As regards trade, some 300 ships traverse the Indian Ocean every day and on an average, 40 super tankers pass through the nine-degree channel daily. Annually, an estimated US \$ 260 billion worth of oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz, and Straits of Malacca.
- 1.43 India sits astride these major commercial routes and energy life-lines. The A&N Islands dominate the approaches to the Malacca Straits whilst the Lakshadweep Group lies across the nine degree channel; and the Persian Gulf is only 600 miles from our shores. By virtue of our geography, we are in a position to greatly influence the secure movement of shipping along the Sea Line of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region.

#### **JAPAN**

- 1.44 Japan is gradually redefining its political, economic and security role in the Asia Pacific region, whilst retaining its well established commitment to the US-Japan alliance. The Indo-Japanese relationship has undergone substantial improvement during the last one year and Tokyo appreciates our security concerns better than ever before. Further, different issues of mutual interest were discussed during the visit of the Raksha Mantri to Japan in January 2000. This has helped to forge a better understanding of each other's views on a number of bilateral, regional and international issues.

#### **WEST ASIA**

- 1.45 The Gulf countries, West Asian and North African regions represent part of India's extended neighbourhood. India enjoys multifaceted relations with the countries of the region. This region will remain the primary source of India's energy needs for the foreseeable future. The region would also continue to host a substantial Indian community that contributes to the economic well being of the region. India has also maintained an interest in the progress of the peace process in the Middle East that have a bearing on regional security. Therefore, India has a strategic interest in peace and stability in the region along with the need to keep shipping lanes open and secure.

#### **IRAN**

- 1.46 Iran is witnessing change while adhering to the basic tenets of the Islamic Resolution. Its foreign policy is showing greater dexterity; it is opening up to Europe and is simultaneously not neglecting links with the Arab and Islamic fraternity. The upward trend in oil prices augurs well for Iran. The process of gradual and measured change is likely to continue. Developments in Afghanistan are impacting on Pakistan and Iran. Relations with India are substantially moving forward.

#### **CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS (CARS)**

- 1.47 Central Asia is a part of India's extended neighbourhood and developments in the region have a direct bearing on our security interests. Apart from deep-rooted historical and cultural ties, our societies are also based

on the foundation of secularism. There is thus a common interest in combating the spread of terrorism, religious fundamentalism and drug trafficking emanating from neighbouring Afghanistan. There is intense competition to harness and develop the energy resources of Central Asia. Countries which are in a position to provide transit routes for energy pipelines and trade have the possibility to increase their profile in the region, including in the shaping and evolution of regional associations and groupings, most of which have security dimensions. India has had historic cultural ties with the Central Asian Republics, and it is our endeavour to further develop them.

- 1.48 Due to its strategic proximity to the Middle East and South Asia, Central Asia has emerged as a distinct geopolitical entity, stimulating global attention and interest. The region has vast untapped potential of oil, gas and strategic minerals. Engagement of the Central Asian Republics is thus an essential component of our security. The continued successes of the Taliban in Afghanistan is giving rise to fundamentalist forces in this region. Further success of the Taliban, is likely to affect Indian strategic interest in the Central Asian Republics.

#### **SOUTH EAST ASIA AND ASEAN**

- 1.49 India's relations with South East Asian countries and countries in the South Pacific region have made considerable progress in recent years as a result of our 'Look East' Policy. Recent high level visits from the region to India have included visits of Heads of State/

Heads of Government from Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia and Cambodia. From our side the President has visited Singapore while the Prime Minister has visited Indonesia and Vietnam. There have also been Ministerial level visits in both directions. As a full dialogue partner of the ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) India has engaged the ASEAN countries more closely than in the past with efforts to promote regional and international security. The essential mutuality of interest between India and ASEAN countries has been reflected in the deliberations of the several conferences and workshops that have been held under the ARF process. India expects to continue to make a constructive contribution to this process and to benefit from this interaction by keeping close bilateral relations with each of the ASEAN countries. The security situation in some countries of the region viz. Indonesia, Philippines, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea has worsened in the last few years. The developments flowing from religious and ethnic fundamentalism pose a threat to the democracies in Indonesia and the Philippines and are a matter of concern to us.

1.50 The growing strength of China and uncertainty over the future role of the US in South East Asia had resulted in a regional arms race. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea have the potential to cause military engagements in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. External sources of energy and raw materials will continue to be important to sustain the economics of the Asia-Pacific region. The

Japanese economy in particular is highly dependent on free and assured passage of its oil along the long shipping lanes. Drugs and small arms proliferation is likely to assume greater importance particularly with increasing incidents of sea piracy, both in South China Seas and in the Indian Ocean. Worsening of the security environment in South East Asia could affect regional stability, and will directly impinge on our interests.

- 1.51 India has been actively participating in various Confidence Building Measures at the ASEAN Regional Forum. This co-operation has led to exchange of views on various topical problems that the region is facing. Important ones are: -
- (a) Prevention of transnational crimes like Sea Piracy, small arms proliferation, trans-border migration and smuggling of narcotics and drugs.
  - (b) Humanitarian assistance, disaster management, and civil-military co-operation in peace support operations.
  - (c) Participation in workshops on 'Preventive Diplomacy', Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Co-operation.

#### RUSSIA

1.52 India's relations with the Russian Federation are characterized by continuity, trust and mutual understanding. These were further consolidated and elevated to a Strategic Partnership during the historic visit to India by the President of the Russian Federation, H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin, from October 2-5, 2000. During the visit, 17 bilateral docu-

ments including the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between India and the Russian Federation were signed. President Putin reiterated Russia's unqualified support for India's candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. He also appreciated the measures taken by India in combating terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir. Russia welcomed India's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and appreciated the Indian Government's efforts to develop a broad national consensus on the issue of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

1.53 President Putin's 4-day visit to India (October 2-6, 2000) reaffirmed the strategic partnership between the two countries and opened up further possibilities of cooperation in diverse fields including Military and nuclear cooperation. President Putin came out in support of India's position on Jammu & Kashmir and pledged to cooperate with India in its fight against terrorism.

1.54 The then Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, H.E. Mr. Sergei Ivanov, paid an official visit to India from April 26-28, 2000. During the visit, a protocol on cooperation between the National Security Councils of India and the Security Council of the Russian Federation was signed. Indo-Russian Joint Cooperation Groups on International and Regional Security and on International Terrorism have been set up as per this protocol. Meetings of these Coordination Groups were held in Moscow from February 19-21, 2001.

1.55 In line with the decision taken during the

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visit of President Putin to India, an Indo-Russian Joint Working Group (JWG) on Afghanisation has been set up. The first meeting of this JWG was held in New Delhi on November 20-21, 2000.

#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- 1.56 There was a significant increase in bilateral dialogue and cooperation between India and USA in the year 2000. President Clinton visited India in March 2000 and the Prime Minister paid a reciprocal visit to the United States in September. The two leaders outlined a vision of closer and qualitatively new relationship between the two countries in Delhi and reaffirmed it in Washington, and established an architecture of wide ranging institutional dialogue, as a means to pursue the relationship.
- 1.57 The two sides have assessed positively the ongoing dialogue on security and non-proliferation issues and have agreed to continue it to further narrow differences in this area. India has reiterated its constructive approach on security matters, based on its vital security interests, and that India will continue to be guided by its security perceptions in defining its security requirements. As part of the efforts to increase mutual understanding and cooperation on security issues, the two sides have also established a bilateral Asian Security Dialogue, a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism, a Joint Working Group on UN Peacekeeping Operations and have also agreed to set up a bilateral framework for dialogue on Afghanistan.
- 1.58 India has a continuing interest in improving

bilateral defence cooperation with USA based on mutual respect, mutual benefit, equality and understanding. Although there has been limited resumption of contacts between high level military officials and participation in training courses and seminars since May 1998, the institutional framework for cooperation that had evolved over the years remains suspended by the USA.

#### INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

- 1.59 India remains a firm and consistent proponent of general and complete disarmament and attaches the highest priority to global nuclear disarmament. India's policy on disarmament also takes into account changes that have taken place in the world, especially in the 1990s. The nuclear tests of May 1998 do not dilute India's commitment to this long-held objective. This sets the country apart from other nuclear weapon States, which reject global nuclear disarmament proposals because they refuse to visualise their security without nuclear weapons. As a nuclear weapon State, India is even more conscious of its responsibility in this regard and, as in the past, initiatives in pursuit of global nuclear disarmament continue to be taken by India both individually and collectively. The steps that were announced after the tests, and the initiatives that India has taken, strengthen this continued commitment. India has also unambiguously indicated its support to the establishment of an *Ad-hoc* Committee in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to negotiate a phased programme

for global nuclear disarmament. India remains committed to co-operating with like-minded States to attain this goal.

- 1.60 India's nuclear weapons capability is meant only for self-defence and seeks only to ensure that India's security, independence and integrity are not threatened in the future. India is not interested in a nuclear arms race. This is the rationale behind the two pillars of India's nuclear policy -minimum deterrence and no-first-use.
- 1.61 India continues to maintain its opposition to the NPT as a discriminatory and flawed treaty. Its indefinite extension has merely reinforced these discriminatory aspects with a majority of the States being unable to persuade the original five nuclear weapon States to commit themselves to nuclear disarmament. The indefinite extension of the NPT has sought to legitimise the possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of these five nuclear weapon States. The Sixth NPT Review Conference took place in New York from April 24 to May 19, 2000. India has rejected the Conference's statements and prescriptions calling for a roll-back of its nuclear weapons programme. The understanding by the five nuclear weapon Parties to the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament has also not so far been matched by any concrete actions.
- 1.62 India has maintained that lasting non-proliferation can only be achieved through disarmament. In the wake of India's nuclear tests, concerns have been expressed about transfer of these weapons or related know-

- how to other countries. India has an effective system of export controls and shall make it more stringent where necessary, including by expanding negative lists of equipment and technology to make them more effective in the context of a nuclear India. This was done in the EXIM policy announced on April 1, 2000. However, India's participation in various export control regimes would only be on the basis of equality.
- 1.63 After concluding the series of tests on May 11 and 13 1998, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. In announcing this moratorium, India accepted the core obligation of a test ban and also addressed the general wish of the international community. This moratorium continues, subject to the supreme national interests, a provision granted under the CTBT to every country. India has also announced its willingness to move towards a *de jure* formalisation of this voluntary undertaking, and is in the process of building a national consensus on signing the CTBT .
- 1.64 India supports efforts for negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that would prohibit the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes. This has been articulated by India in the UN through concrete proposals like the Action Plan which it presented in 1988. India also co-sponsored a UNGA resolution (48/75L) in 1993, which called for early commencement of negotiations for the prohibition of fissile material production for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. India believes that this is an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process. It would also go a long way in arresting the problem of illegal transfers of nuclear material.
- 1.65 India's nuclear doctrine is based on maintaining a minimum credible deterrent and a no-first-use policy as opposed to nuclear war fighting doctrines or postures of launch on warning. It is, therefore, natural for India to take initiatives that aim to reduce the threat of breakout of nuclear war. Since 1998, India has regularly tabled a resolution at the UN to address the problem posed by the hair trigger alert level of nuclear weapons. This resolution has been approved by the UN General Assembly every year, in addition to the other traditional disarmament initiatives taken by India at the UN, in particular the resolution on a draft Convention to ban the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- 1.66 India consistently maintains that arms control treaties need to be implemented fully, in letter and spirit to maintain stability. Unilateral actions ignoring existing treaties may reduce the prospects for further nuclear disarmament and erode the non-proliferation constraints. A combination of de-alerting, diplomacy and disarmament is a better response than ballistic missile defence systems to the concerns posed by missile proliferation. De-alerting measures would reduce risks associated with accidental or unauthorised launches, appropriate political and diplomatic measures that could address concerns related to some ballistic missile programmes, and an accelerated nuclear disarmament process that would reduce the reliance on these weapons and eventually lead to their abolition.
- 1.67 As an original Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, India remains committed to discharging, fully and faithfully, its obligations under the Convention. The destruction schedule prescribed by the Convention is being fully met. India believes that all Parties to the Convention should ensure that they fulfil the obligations they have assumed under the Convention. In this context, the continued existence of *ad hoc*, export control regimes is contrary to the international legal commitments that States have undertaken to abide by under the Convention.
- 1.68 India has ratified the Amended Protocol -II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which restricts the use of anti-personnel landmines, and the new Protocol -IV which prohibits the use of blinding laser weapons. India is fully committed to the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) and achievement of the objective of a non-discriminatory and universal ban on APLs, while addressing the legitimate defence requirements of the States. Aware of the humanitarian crisis arising from the unrestrained transfers and indiscriminate use of APLs, India remains committed to its existing moratorium on transfers of APLs. India has also been contributing to several UN de-mining efforts since the Congo peace-keeping operations in 1962.
- 1.69 India is committed to strengthening the norm of transparency in conventional arma-

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ments in general, and greater participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, in particular. India has been submitting its reports to the Register annually since 1994. The issue of proliferation of and illicit trafficking in small arms has moved up the agenda of the international community on disarmament issues. India is aware of this problem and remains committed to participate actively in the international search for effective solutions, including the Firearms Protocol being negotiated in Vienna and the forthcoming International Conference in July 2001 to discuss the issue of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. Indian experts are participating in the current work of UN panels on both these subjects.

- 1.70 India is fully committed to maintaining peace and stability with its neighbours through a continuous process of confidence building and substantive dialogue to expand the scope of bilateral interactions. CBMs or other means of formalising restraint have to be tailor-made to specific situations and have to be multi-dimensional, encompassing political, military, economic and cultural aspects. India's approach to confidence building has unilateral, bilateral and regional aspects. Examples of unilateral restraint practised by India include a defensive orientation of its defence policy and force postures; strict control over defence budgets; and, in the nuclear field, commitment to no-first-use, moratorium on nuclear testing, minimum credible nuclear deterrence, and the rejection of an arms race or concepts and postures

from the Cold War era. Bilateral formalisation of restraint has taken place both in the India-Pakistan as well as the India-China contexts.

- 1.71 At the Asia-Pacific, level, India is an active participant in the regional security dialogue of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which has been focussing on building confidence and trust and has before it a basket of proposals on CBMs for future consideration. India sees the ARF as an experiment for fashioning a new pluralistic, cooperative security order in tune with the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region, and in consonance with the transition away from a world characterised by poles built around military alliances. India's participation in the ARF demonstrates its increasing engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, both in politico-security and economic spheres, and of its commitment to the objective of sustaining regional peace and stability.
- 1.72 India also actively participates in the meetings of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) - an initiative taken by Kazakhstan. The Declaration of Principles guiding relations among CICA Member States signed in 1999 reaffirms the objective of promoting better relations among Asian States, while calling for a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and balanced approach towards international security. It also reiterates the Member States' determination to promote international and regional cooperation to counter and eradicate all forms of terrorism.

## ECONOMIC SECURITY

- 1.74 The bulk of India's oil imports come from the Gulf. To safeguard the exploration and exploitation of resources in our EEZ, as also our maritime assets and infrastructure, it is necessary to have a credible ocean capability of the Navy to meet our legitimate security needs.

## ENERGY SECURITY

- 1.75 India's entire developmental process rests on the availability of energy resources, and therefore, energy availability and affordability is absolutely vital to the country. Ninety per cent of our oil comes either from off-shore oil fields, or is transported over the sea from abroad.
- Mutually beneficial arrangements with India's eastern neighbours as well as Nepal for long term energy exploitation and sharing.
  - Protection of the energy infrastructure within the country from disruption by terrorists and militants.
  - Energy co-operation and sharing arrangements only with countries whose actions do not undermine India's security and which have demonstrated a willingness to co-operate meaningfully with India.
  - International transit of energy destined for India through stable, secure and friendly countries where there is no danger of disruption of supplies by state and non-state actors for political ends.
  - Focussed investments in maritime and naval assets to ensure adequate reach and endurance.
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