(Following is an excerpt from the speech delivered by the author as the sixth Field Marshal Cariappa Memorial Lecture at 
Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi)

This is an era of coalition politics and we have a coalition of over dozen parties. Many of them are regional parties based on linguistic and even caste and communal considerations. With some rare exceptions most of the members belonging to these parties are largely interested in local issues affecting their constituencies and not very much in international and national security issues. This is understandable. Some of them become members of Parliamentary Standing Committees on defence and foreign affairs. One hopes that it gives them some opportunity to widen their horizons. However, there is no institutionalised mechanism for their being able to acquire more knowledge and background in these fields. Unlike in other established democracies where there are a number of publications on foreign policy and defence issued by the government every year outlining assessments and policies and periodic briefings, there are none in India except the routine annual reports which only give sketchy accounts of what happened in the previous year rather than what is likely to happen and what the country should be doing.

Again in other established democracies there are think-tanks manned by specialists who have access to government information on a graded basis. Often the think-tanks are given contracts for studies to be done for the government departments. They have to be provided with all the necessary information by the government to carry out such studies. In India the government has a tradition of not even sharing the time of the day with any non-official, autonomous and academic institutions. Often officials do not even share information with their colleagues who have a need to know.

Nor our media have many people who specialise on defence, though of late a start has been made. In the West, the defence and foreign policy establishments hand out every day so many stories. A tacit relationship develops between the government, its agencies and the media. Even while being critical the media in those countries does not have an adversarial relationship with the government and its agencies on national security issues. This is not always the case here.

The net result of all these factors is inadequate attention to problems of national security. The responsibility for this situation rests squarely on the successive governments and the national security establishment. The NDA government began with a proclaimed commitment to national security of a much higher order and established a National Security Council, a National Security Advisory Board and a Strategic Planning group in 1998. A new beginning was made and there was a break in tradition. Kargil Review Committee was set up and its report was published. Then came the group of ministers to revamp the entire national security framework as recommended by the Kargil Review Committee. The four task forces set up by them have completed their work and submitted their reports promptly. It is expected that the group of ministers will act equally promoptly and come up with their recommendations. Hopefully the country is likely to witness a progressive revamping of national security framework for the first time since independence. That is an encouraging news.

But while the structures may get reformed and updated, the problem of attitudinal change towards national security is beyond the scope of this group of ministers. That is a matter for political leadership at the highest level. The media has commented that the National security Council set up in 1998 had hardly met. The NSC and cabinet committee on National Security (CCNS) has with one exception the same composition in terms of five cabinet ministers, including the Prime Minister. The secretariat for CCNS is the cabinet secretariat while for the NSC it is the NSC secretariat.

The two bodies have however, totally different roles. The CCNS is a decision making body which has to focus on current security problems. It has also to approve decisions on current equipment procurement. The NSC has an advisory and deliberating role to develop long term future oriented perspectives and to direct the ministries to come up with their policies and recommendations to the CCNS and monitor their implementation. Because of this role the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission is also a member of the NSC. In order to play this role effectively it needs long term as well as current intelligence assessments. Its deliberations and advice on long term policies will have to be based on such assessments. It would appear from the reports that NSC has not met, that in this country, without a tradition of strategic thinking and without much interest in national security. It has not been found easy to get over the indertia and switch to a culture of anticipatory planning for national security. There are many reasons for it.

Our intelligence agencies have not been equipped and oriented towards long term intelligence forecasting. Our foreign service is mostly geared to react to immediate events. Policy planning has never taken off in that ministry. The Joint Intelligence Committee and long term intelligence assessments have never been given due importance because of the lack of interest in anticipatory security planning. Therefore, there is not sufficient awareness in the government that the country is not equipped to plan long term national security policy. At best it is equipped only to carry out short term and current national security management. This is a crucial challenge to Indian security. Because of this grave lacunae the National Security Council is not able to function after it was formally set up two years ago.

The tragedy is that even the nature of illness has not been diagnosed. Only the symptoms are being treated. That is to be welcomed but that will not produce a permanent cure. The situation is likely to become further complicated with the new role we have envisaged for India as a state with nuclear weapon, an emerging economic power on high growth trajectory, a strategic partner of major powers, a global player, an aspiring permanent member of the security council and increasingly democratising and federalising polity. We are to achieve all these objectives as an open society.

There is inadequate realisation in this country that achieving these aims will amount to a major alteration of the status quo in Asia and the world. There will be a lot of resistance to it from both within and outside the country. In conceptual terms steering India towards the goals smoothly and safely with minimum damage is the basic security challenge to India. If that task is to be successfully tackled there has to be a long term coherent thinking on the risks and threats we are likely to face and long term planning to deal with them. Let us enumerate the threats and risks and how to deal with them, briefly.

The Indian leadership accepted the need for nuclear deterrence from early 1980s when Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi initiated the nuclear weapons programmes in response to Pakistan-China nuclear proliferation axis which had the tacit acquiescence of the US. India declared itself a nuclear weapon state after the Shakti tests in 1998. The National Security Advisory Board has come out with a draft nuclear doctrine. In my view, understandably because I was the convenor of the Board, the doctrine is the most logical, most restrained and most economical. But it is only a draft doctrine. Strategies, policies targetting plans, command and control all need to be worked out. It is not enough if the country has nuclear weapons. It should be able to project credible deterrence. Deterrence involves some aspects of transparency and other of opacity. Therefore, there is an urgent need to work out the correct mix. A partially visible command and control structure is an essential ingredient in deterrence. Demonstration of capabilities of vectors is yet another. A robust and secure C4-1-2 system is the third. A clearly ordained political and military succession is fourth. A demonstrated involvement of political leadership in command and control exercise is fifth and so on. Not only these issues should be addressed but they should be seen to be addressed.

Fortunately, if we take him at his word, General Musharraf agrees with our Prime Minister that there are no significant risks of nuclear weapons being used in war between the two countries. Logically, he follows that perception with the proposition that even large scale conventional wars are unlikely. Our recent preparedness should reinforce him in that perception. We should continue our efforts to dissuade him from thinking about large scale conventional war by having a visible dissuasive capability. However, General Musharraf does not rule out proxy wars. Last year in April 1999 he predicted that while nuclear and conventional wars were unlikely the probability of proxy wars was on the rise. He was in a position to assert it most knowledgeably since at that time, his Northern Light Infantry men were infiltrating the Kargil heights. His attempt in Kargil ended in disaster. Therefore, India should be prepared to face proxy wars in future as it has been doing for the past 17 years. Till now and as of today the proxy war is being fought by India on the basis of adhoc improvisation.

Surely there is scope for a comprehensive and integrated strategy against proxy war waged against this country. Counter-terrorism needs societal mobilisation and effective intelligence effort. Various steps in counter-offensive operations will have to be thought though the most important being in the field of information campaign.

Those who wage proxy war against this country take advantage of our weaknesses. The faultlines in our society are exploited. Our borders have been porous. Drugs, man-portable arms, terrorists, fake currency and illegal immigrants are able to pass through. 7 tonnes of high explosives could be landed on Maharashtra coast in one instance. Our air space too was violated with impunity when arms were dropped at Purulia.

This country has contributed the term politician - bureaucracy- organised crime nexus to political lexicon. Political-cum-bureaucratic corruption is rampant in the country because of the role played by money and muscle power in elections. Corruption at lower levels can not be effectively tackled when there is corruption at higher levels. A widely corrupt society cannot provide good and efficient governance. A corrupt and misgoverned polity is highly vulnerable from the point of view of national security. It is like a body affected by the AIDS disease. The immunity to resist infections drops and the body is liable to various kinds of diseases.

Foreign intelligence agencies can make use of organised crime, like narcotics barons, money launderers and smugglers to infiltrate arms and terrorists. Some years ago Pakistan press published an interview with one of their drug barons, Haji Iqbal Beg who boasted that he sent the drugs across to his friends in India who shipped them to Europe and America. A CIA report gave details of the activities of
Pakistan drug barons and their transactions via India. They did not evoke much response in this country.

-K Subrahmanyam