While the concept of village defence groups against terrorist attacks has been prevalent in the eastern states of Nagaland and Manipur for more than three decades, albeit in the form of Village Voluntary Force (VVF) and Village Defence Groups (VDGs), it is a relatively a new concept in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Jammu region saw a massacre in 1998, wherein 26 persons of three families of Prankote village in Udhampur district were killed. This was followed by the killing of 25 members of a wedding party at Chapnari village, near Doda the same year. These killings, almost immediately, triggered off large-scale migration from various areas of Udhampur and Doda where the local public felt threatened. It took massive effort on the part of the civil administration and security forces to instill a sense of self-confidence in the public. The creation of Village Defence Committee (VDC), was one such measure for denying militants a free hand in achieving their nefarious aims.

The Jammu region, consisting of the districts of Poonch, Rajouri, Udhampur, Doda, Jammu and Kathua, is very vast and unique in its terrain characteristics. It encompasses over 26,000 sq kms and it harbours one of the most treacherous and rugged terrains found anywhere in the world, comprising mostly of steep mountains, formidable ridges and dense alpine forests. The rugged terrain also nestles in its soft underbelly a healthy mix of Hindu-Muslim population sprinkled in small hamlets across the region.

The initial VDCs were raised in highly sensitive pockets which were susceptible to attack by militants. As the self-confidence of the public grew alongwith their ability to deter a militant attack, the number of VDCs grew rapidly. By current estimates, Doda district alone has over 800 VDCs spread all over the region. A nucleus VDC consists of approximately 10 members which includes two or three Special Police Officers (SPOs). The members, many ex-servicemen, are selected by the villagers themselves, and are armed with sufficient quantity of ammunition. Sensitive VDCs are also provided with radio communication. Location and sensitivity of a VDC is decided by facts like isolation, terrain peculiarities, demography, vulnerability of the area and threat perception. Close touch is maintained with the nearest security forces (SF) post.

From the beginning, the VDC has proved to be of immense help to the SF. Over the years, with constant training, monitoring and performance evaluation, the VDC has become a deterrent force. Raising of VDC has boosted the confidence level of the local people, particularly, of the minority community. It has also reduced migration to a negligible level, apart from marginalisation of recruitment and support bases to terrorists. It has also contributed to the operational success of SF by providing guides and 'spotters' to identify terrorists. Apart from supplementing and providing impetus to the operational efficiency of SF, some of the VDCs have undertaken counter-terrorism operations by themselves.

With the provision of more sophisticated weapons, equipment and intensive training, the VDCs may have more teeth to defend their villages and deny terrorists any form of popular support base. This will finally lead to the erosion of the operational efficiency of militants.

The enlarging arc of terrorism in Jammu region has adequately highlighted the role of VDC as a force multiplier in combating the so called ‘proxy war’. The VDCs augurs well for the civil population in particular and Jammu region, in general.